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Summary 
Cognitive scientists, psychologists, neuro-biologists, and computer scientists 
achieved significant progress in understanding and modelling the fuzzy concept 
‘emotion’ and more general ‘affect’. Accordingly, a variety of computational 
realizations, discussed by Marsella, Gratch, and Petta in Chapter MGP of this 
volume, stem from a number of different psychological theories and philosophical 
conceptions. As correctly classified in Chapter MGP the computational realization 
we propose, labelled WASABI ([W]ASABI [A]ffect [S]imulation for [A]gents with 
[B]elievable [I]nteractivity), performs a mapping of appraisal outcome into a three 
dimensional space of pleasure, arousal, and dominance or PAD space in short, and it 
thereby ‘breaks the link’ between the internal representation of affect and its external 
domain object. Accordingly, we will present and discuss here, how the phenomenon 
of post-hoc misattribution, i.e., a mismatch between an emotion’s objective and its 
subjective cause, can be modelled and explained by the WASABI architecture.  
The central idea of this architecture is to combine two dimensions, namely 
emotional valence and valence of mood, such that their mutual influence generates a 
continuously changing, self-rebalancing internal state, which can be interpreted as 
constituting a very basic, non-relational, short-term memory of affect. Whenever 
some external or internal event (the latter, for example, resulting from cognitive 
reasoning processes) is appraised as having an emotional effect, this effect is 
translated into an impulse of emotional valence, which then disturbs the internal 
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emotion dynamics. At the same time internal cognitive reasoning further analyzes the 
event to determine, if it is a candidate for elicitation of an emotion. In the current state 
of the architecture this reasoning is limited to the generation and checking of 
expectations within the context of a well-defined interaction scenario serving as proof 
of concept. The emotions are represented in PAD space such that a particular emotion 
can only be elicited (or in more philosophical terms ‘become aware to the agent’) if 
the agent’s current internal feeling state represented in PAD space allows for it.  
Although this architecture is already considerably complex, we admit that this is 
only our first attempt to grapple with the complex dynamic interplay of cognitive and 
bodily processes from which emotions are assumed to arise. Accordingly, we hope 
that the WASABI architecture, on the one hand, provides fruitful impulses to the 
interdisciplinary endeavour of understanding human emotionality, and, on the other 
hand, can serve as one example of a blueprint for how to increase a conversational 
agent’s affective competency. 
1 Introduction to WASABI’s core ideas 
As pointed out by Marsella, Gratch, and Petta in Chapter MGP a variety of 
computational models of emotions stem from different psychological and 
philosophical theories. When we started developing our own computational model of 
affect, which later was entitled WASABI, it was tempting to follow the ideas and 
conceptions of the by then famous structural model of emotions (Ortony, Clore, & 
Collins, 1988), or OCC model in short, as many other computer scientists had done 
before. The limitations and problems of this model, however, had already become 
apparent (Bartneck, 2002) so that we decided to first concentrate on modelling the 
temporal dynamics of emotions instead (Becker, Kopp, & Wachsmuth, 2004). We 
furthermore limited ourselves to only simulate the temporal unfolding of an emotion’s 
intensity, postponing the question of how to realize cognitive appraisal. We also did 
not follow the ‘basic emotions’ idea (Ekman, 1999), but instead combined simple 
hedonic valence with a very basic conception of positive versus negative mood. These 
two dimensions were arranged to form an orthogonal space, which is labeled ‘emotion 
dynamics’ and can be found in the lower left corner of Figure 1. Within this space the 
mutual interaction between hedonic valence (represented on the x-axis) and mood 
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(represented on the y-axis) is simulated such that a so-called emotion dynamics 
continuously unfolds over time. 
---------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here. 
---------- 
Eventually we added a third, orthogonal dimension to this space to account for 
those cases when nothing emotionally relevant happens over a certain period of time. 
This z-axis is labelled ‘boredom’ to indicate that any value along this axis represents 
an agent’s level of boredom (see Figure 2). 
---------- 
Insert Figure 2 about here. 
---------- 
The temporal unfolding and mutual interaction of emotion and mood is realized 
as follows: 
1. The x-value is interpreted as a gradient, in relation to which the y-value 
increases or decreases. The more positive the value on the x-axis, the 
faster the y-value increases; the more negative the x-value, faster the y-
value decreases. Speaking in the language of affective sciences, this 
models a fortifying and alleviating effect that emotions are assumed to 
have on moods, which is graphically indicated by the white up and 
down arrows in Figure 2. 
2. Any non-zero value on either of the two axes is constantly pulled back 
to zero by applying two simulated forces Fx and Fy, which are exerted 
by two independently simulated spring-mass systems virtually attached 
to the reference point, see Figure 2. In terms of modelling affect, the 
simulation parameters are normally chosen such that in case of equal 
displacements for x and y the reset force Fx is greater than the reset 
force Fy, because emotions are commonly considered to last less long 
than moods. 
With this basic setup in place, which is described in more detail in (Becker, 
Kopp, & Wachsmuth, 2007), a single emotional impulse of hedonic valence (see 
Figure 1) is sufficient to start the emotion dynamics. The impulse causes an 
instantaneous displacement of the reference point and an agent’s internal emotional 
state will change dynamically over time (as indicated by the dashed line connecting 
 4 
the coordinate system’s origin with the point of reference in Figure 2) until it reaches 
the point of origin again, if no further impulses arrived in the meantime. When for a 
longer period of time no emotional impulses disturb the emotion dynamics, the z-
value changes linearly to simulate an agent’s increasing level of boredom. 
Next, the three values x (emotion), y (mood), and z (boredom) need to be 
integrated in order allow for mapping them on named emotions, which are finally 
transmitted back to the appraisal module (see Figure 1). At this point, we decided to 
map into pleasure-arousal-dominance space, PAD space in short (Mehrabian A. , 
1995), as described by the following equations: 
 
 
Equation 1 
 
---------- 
Insert Figure 3 about here. 
---------- 
All variables in Equation 1 are indexed with t, because the emotion dynamics is 
updated 25 times per second to achieve a seemingly continuous simulation of internal 
feeling state. In PAD space primary emotions are located as indicated by the crosses 
in Figure 3 and secondary emotions occupy areas on the levels of high and low 
dominance. The smaller the distance between an agent’s emotional state, as 
represented by the continuously updated PAD triple PAD(xt, yt, zt) (see Equation 1), 
and any of the primary emotions, the more likely the agent gets aware of this emotion 
with an intensity that is inversely proportional to this distance. If the agent’s 
emotional state enters a region representing a secondary emotion, which was triggered 
just before, then this secondary emotion gets aware to the agent with an intensity 
derived from its intensity distribution in PAD space; see (Becker-Asano & 
Wachsmuth, 2009) for details. 
The motivation for this quite complex interplay between cognitive reasoning 
and emotion dynamics will be clarified in the light of the interdisciplinary background 
and it will be contrasted with related work in affective computing. Basically, we can 
explain our motivation in relation to Marsella et al.’s conceptions (see Chapter 
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MGP, this volume). The dynamic simulation explained so far makes detailed 
representational and process commitments for affect-derivation, but leaves open how 
an agent’s relationship with the external world influences its appraisal of events, other 
agents, or objects within that world. An emotional impulse can be derived from any 
kind of cognitive appraisal process, but it might also by product of hard wired, 
reactive perception-action patterns. From an engineering point of view, this flexibility 
allows for the core emotion dynamics to be combined easily with different 
computational architectures as long as they feed the emotion dynamics with emotional 
impulses, trigger primary and secondary emotions whenever appropriate, and make 
reasonable use of the set of aware emotions they receive in return. From a 
psychological point of view, we naturally assure mood-congruency of emotions, 
because, e.g., only in case of bad mood negative emotional impulses have the effect 
of eliciting anger in the WASABI architecture. When the agent is in good mood, in 
contrast, negative impulses will only dampen the good mood first, before it might get 
negative enough to allow for the elicitation of negative emotions. Furthermore, by 
decoupling the domain object from the subjective emotional response, posthoc 
reasoning about what might have been causing an agent’s current emotional state can 
reasonably be performed. In result, the subjective cause might not match the objective 
cause and, thus, an agent driven by the WASABI architecture is susceptible to 
misattribution. 
2 Interdisciplinary background 
Our approach to modelling affective competency for our virtual human ‘Max’ is 
derived from and relates to a multitude of different ideas, conceptions, and theories of 
psychologists, cognitive scientists, philosophers, and neurobiologists. WASABI’s 
core of simulating an emotion dynamics in three-dimensional affect space can be 
traced back to the ideas of the philosopher Wilhelm Wundt (1922/1863), who claimed 
that any emotion can be characterized as a continuous progression in such a three-
dimensional affect space. By now the validity of dimensional theories of affect is 
widely accepted and the interested reader might kindly be referred to (Becker-Asano 
C. , 2008) for an introduction to the history of this class of theories. 
In the following, however, we will concentrate on explaining how our 
architecture relates to Scherer’s Component Process Model (CPM, see Chapter S of 
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this volume), from which it derives a number of ideas. Afterwards, the 
neurobiological background of the WASABI architecture will be outlined in order to 
explain the rationale for distinguishing two classes of emotions, namely primary and 
secondary emotions. 
2.1 WASABI in relation to the CPM 
Scherer distinguishes the following five functions for the theoretical construct 
of emotions in the context of the CPM (see Chapter S of this volume): 
1. Evaluation of objects and events 
2. Regulation of internal subsystems 
3. Preparation for action 
4. Signalling of behavioural intention 
5. Monitoring of internal state and external environment 
Although the WASABI architecture is not directly derived from Scherer’s 
CPM, we follow the above distinction and believe that we can account for a subset of 
these functions as follows (cp. Figure 1): 
Evaluation of objects and events: Appraisal processes that enable our agent to 
evaluate external objects and events are realized in a software module, which is based 
on the Belief-Desire-Intention (BDI) approach to modelling rational reasoning (Rao 
& Georgeff, 1991). In this module goals and plans are explicitly represented, 
expectations are generated, and current events are evaluated against previous 
expectations. This cognition module, which contains the agent’s Appraisal module, 
will be explained in Section 4.1 in the context of the general explanation of our 
virtual agent Max. 
Regulation of internal subsystems: According to Scherer (2001) this function is 
served by the ‘peripheral efference component’ and in (Scherer, 1984) ‘the 
physiological component of activation and arousal’ is made responsible for this 
function. Therefore, we assume that our simulation of emotion dynamics, which is 
driven by external and internal forces and continuously updates an agent’s arousal 
level, can—at least to some respect—fulfil this function. 
Preparation for action: This function is realized in the WASABI architecture by 
letting our agent’s breathing and eye blinking frequency be modulated by the 
simulated arousal, which might be interpreted as ‘preparing for action’ by an outside 
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observer. We have to admit, however, that we do not explicitly model ‘behaviour 
tendencies’, which are postulated by Scherer (1984) as being part of this function. 
Signalling of behavioural intention: Our agent’s facial expressions are directly driven 
by the primary emotions of the WASABI architecture such that the ‘motor 
component’ is realized quite straight forward. Furthermore, in case of secondary 
emotions such as hope or relief the agent’s cognition generates appropriate verbal 
expressions, which are seamlessly combined with non-verbal expressions driven by 
primary emotions. 
Monitoring of internal state and external environment: Although the WASABI 
architecture simulates a continuously changing internal state through the 
implementation of an emotion dynamics, we do not explicitly model a monitoring 
process that, according to Scherer (Chapter S, this volume), is necessary to achieve 
subjective feeling states. We believe, however, that our architecture is a promising 
candidate for extensions toward the simulation of such subjective aspects of emotions. 
In addition to these functional similarities the WASABI architecture as it is 
outlined in Figure 1 can conceptually be divided into two modules, which are 
comparable to two of the three CPM modules presented by Scherer in Figure 1 on 
page XX of this volume. 
Scherer’s Appraisal module consists of one sub-module labelled ‘Multilevel 
appraisal’, which is responsible for very sophisticated and detailed ‘sequential 
evaluation checks’. In contrast, the computationally realized Appraisal module of the 
WASABI architecture permits much less sophisticated appraisal than proposed by the 
CPM. Nevertheless, we believe that we can account for some of the proposed 
evaluation checks as will be detailed in Section 3 where our agent’s cognitive 
reasoning abilities are described. 
Although the Component patterning module is omitted in our architecture, the 
changes within the emotion dynamics part of the Integration/Categorization module 
(see Figure 1) can be understood as to simulate physiological responses, which are 
part of Scherer’s module. In addition, Motor expression of emotions is achieved 
within the Integration/Categorization module of the WASABI architecture as well, 
after emotion, mood, and boredom have been mapped into PAD space as described 
above. 
By representing emotions in PAD space we also account for 
Categorization/Labelling, which is part of Scherer’s third Categorization module (see 
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Figure 1, Chapter S on page XX). We lack, however, a Central representation of all 
components, unless one argues that this representation is achieved by the dynamically 
changing, emotion-related belief-structures within the BDI-based Appraisal module.  
2.2 Primary and secondary emotions 
A major difference between the WASABI architecture and the CPM consists of 
the distinction of two classes of emotions in WASABI, primary and secondary 
emotions. These two classes are derived from neurobiological research findings of 
Damasio (1994).  
Primary emotions are supposed to be innate and they are understood as 
prototypical emotion types, which can already be ascribed to one year-old-children 
(Damasio, 2003). Secondary emotions are assumed to arise from higher cognitive 
processes and to be acquired during ontogenesis through learning processes in a social 
context. Damasio (1994) uses the adjective ‘secondary’ to refer to ‘adult’ emotions, 
which ‘utilize the machinery of primary emotions’ by influencing the acquisition of 
‘dispositional representations’, which are necessary for the elicitation of secondary 
emotions. These acquired dispositional representations, however, are believed to be 
different from the ‘innate dispositional representations’ underlying primary emotions. 
In the WASABI architecture this representational difference is reflected in the 
following two ways: 
1. The PAD space representation of secondary emotions is much less precise 
than that of primary emotions (see Figure 3), because the former require 
much more elaborate cognitive reasoning than the latter. 
2. Appraisal processes do not necessarily need to trigger primary emotions, 
before they can be elicited in PAD space. For secondary emotions to be 
elicited, however, this triggering in PAD space is a necessary precondition, 
as will be explained in Section 4.2. 
We follow Damasio’s distinction, because it allows us to start with a set of more 
‘primitive’ primary emotions, which can already be elicited by fast, hard-wired 
perception-action patterns without the need for complex deliberation. This is, of 
course, mostly a rather technical motivation, but doing so might eventually allow us 
to investigate developmental aspects of emotions. In fact, the results of an empirical 
study confirmed the hypothesis that an agent simulating secondary emotions in 
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addition to primary ones is judged older than one that only simulates primary 
emotions (Becker-Asano & Wachsmuth, 2009). 
3 The virtual human Max 
The virtual human Max (see Figure 4, left) developed at Bielefeld University’s 
Artificial Intelligence Laboratory has been employed in a number of scenarios in 
which Max’s conversational capabilities have been steadily extended. In a museum 
application, Max is conducting multimodal smalltalk conversations with visitors to a 
public computer museum. In this setting, the emotion dynamics leads to a greater 
variety of often unpredictable, yet coherent emotion-coloured responses, which add to 
the impression that the agent has a unique personality. Furthermore, the WASABI 
architecture has also been applied to a gaming scenario, in which secondary emotions 
were simulated in addition to primary ones. 
In the following we give a brief overview of our agent’s cognitive architecture, 
before we explain in detail how different levels of appraisal are realized inside of it. 
4.1 The architectural framework of Max 
---------- 
Insert Figure 4 about here. 
---------- 
Max has been developed to study how the natural conversational behaviour of 
humans can be modelled for face-to-face encounters in Virtual Reality. The cognitive 
architecture of Max (see Figure 4, right) realizes and tightly integrates the faculties 
of perception, action, and cognition required to engage in such interactions (Leßmann, 
Kopp, & Wachsmuth, 2006). Although in general it employs the classical perceive-
reason-act triad, all processes of perception, reasoning, and action are running 
concurrently within the architecture. 
Reﬂexes and immediate responses to events are realized by a reactive 
connection between perception and action. Such fast-running stimulus-response loops 
enable Max to also react to internal events and his reactive behaviours include gaze 
tracking as well as focusing the current interaction partner in response to prompting 
signals. In addition, continuous secondary behaviours reside in this layer, which can 
be triggered or modulated by deliberative processes and by the emotional state of the 
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agent. These behaviours let Max appear more lifelike and they include eye blink, 
breathing, and sway. 
Perceptions are also fed into deliberative processes which are responsible for 
interaction management by interpreting input, deciding which actions to take next, 
and composing behaviours to realize them. This reasoning is implemented following 
the BDI approach to modelling rational behaviour and makes use of an extensible set 
of self-contained planners. The architecture further comprises a cognitive, inner loop, 
which feeds internal feedback information upon possible actions to take back to 
deliberation. 
4.2 Three different levels of appraisal 
---------- 
Insert Figure 5 about here. 
---------- 
By exploiting the functionality of the architectural framework described above, 
three levels of appraisal are computationally realized for Max within the Appraisal 
module, see Figure 5. Reactive as well as Cognitive appraisal serve as input for the 
Integration/Categorization module whereas Cognitive reappraisal evaluates the 
resulting set of aware emotions in the light of cognitively represented situational 
context information. 
a) Reactive appraisal: This sub-module realizes aspects of the first appraisal 
objective postulated by Scherer’s CPM (see Chapter S, this volume). Max 
uses a look up table to assess an event’s intrinsic pleasantness and checks, if 
the event complies with his expectations. The intrinsic pleasantness directly 
translates into an emotional impulse to be sent to the emotion dynamics. 
Only if the event is unexpected, the primary emotion ‘surprise’ is triggered 
in PAD space (see Figure 1), such that Max is not surprised by events he 
could expect to happen. A similar assessment lets the Appraisal module 
trigger the primary emotion ‘fear’, when Max expects some negative event 
to happen in the near future.
1
 
                                                 
1
 ‘Fear’ is a very special primary emotion within the WASABI architecture, because it is the 
only prospect-based emotion that does not belong to the class of secondary emotions. Accordingly, a 
strict distinction between primary and secondary emotions is sometimes problematic and we hope our 
architecture can serve as basis for further discussion. 
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b) Cognitive appraisal: Central to this sub-module is the evaluation of an 
event’s goal conduciveness (or its obstructiveness, respectively). As 
described in Chapter S in the context of Scherer’s CPM an intrinsically 
pleasant event (e.g., the delicious cake offered by a friend) can nevertheless 
be negative, if it hinders an individual from achieving a higher-level goal 
(e.g., sticking to a diet). With respect to secondary emotions, deliberative 
reasoning about goal-conduciveness of possible future events takes place in 
this module as well. This prospect-based deliberation might give rise to 
emotions such as ‘hope’ or ‘fear’ (‘hope’ being considered a secondary 
emotion) and after an undesired expected event is confirmed or 
disconfirmed, the secondary emotions ‘relief’ or ‘fears-confirmed’ are 
triggered in PAD space, respectively. 
These appraisal processes are both part of the second appraisal objective in 
Scherer’s CPM. Another appraisal target of this sub-module—changing the 
agent’s ‘dominance’—is considered to be part of appraisal objective three in 
the CPM. We use an agent’s ‘dominance’ similar to Scherer’s conception of 
‘power’ and ‘control’, in that it reflects our agent’s level of control over the 
situation as well as his social status. For example, whenever it is Max’s turn 
in a game, the Appraisal module changes his level of dominance to 
maximum and vice versa. 
These appraisal mechanisms generate all necessary input for the 
Integration/Categorization module (see Figure 1). Emotional impulses are derived 
from reactive and cognitive appraisal, primary emotions are triggered in effect of 
reactive appraisal, and, finally, secondary emotions are triggered and the agent’s level 
of dominance is changed as product of cognitive appraisal. 
In result, the Integration/Categorization module eventually sends back to the 
Appraisal module a set of aware emotions with their respective intensities. These 
primary and secondary emotions are then reappraised in the Cognitive reappraisal 
sub-module (see Figure 5). One target of this reappraisal is the assessment of coping 
potential (cp. Scherer’s third appraisal objective of the CPM, Chapter S of this 
volume). We have to admit, however, that our implementation of coping behaviour so 
far is rather simple. In the museum guide scenario Max leaves the scene whenever he 
got very angry and only comes back after he has calmed down again. This ‘calming 
down’ results from WASABI’s internal emotion dynamics, which drifts back to zero 
 12 
automatically in the absence of emotional impulses. We believe that the WASABI 
architecture is well suited for more elaborate realizations of coping-related reasoning, 
as for example implemented by Marsella & Gratch (2006) for their EMA model (see 
Section 5). 
Due to the cognition-independent emotion dynamics simulation the cause of any 
of the aware emotions arriving in the Cognitive reappraisal sub-module needs to be 
re-established. For secondary emotions the cognitive architecture keeps track of the 
emotion’s cause by memorizing it explicitly. Thus, Max can tell, for example, what he 
is relieved about, or why he sees his fears confirmed. The causal reasons for 
experiencing primary emotions such as anger or happiness, however, cannot be 
memorized during the reactive or cognitive appraisal steps, because they might result 
from an accumulation of equally signed emotional impulses which might have 
originated from purely reactive appraisal alone. Accordingly, the WASABI 
architecture allows for misattribution of an emotion’s cause to happen. The processes 
leading to this effect are detailed along the lines of an example interaction in the next 
section. 
4 A case study of causal misattribution in WASABI 
The dynamic interplay of the agent’s appraisal and his emotion dynamics is best 
demonstrated along an example interaction between Max and a human opponent in 
the card game Skip-Bo. We decided to use a playful interaction scenario assuming 
that humans will more openly show their feelings and, thus, also more easily accept a 
virtual agent’s direct way of expressing its emotions. In addition, a game provides 
well-defined boundaries to the set of plausible actions and its rules allow for the 
computational generation of meaningful expectations for the agent. 
---------- 
Insert Figure 6 about here. 
---------- 
The commercial card game Skip-Bo was adapted for our three-dimensional 
cave-like virtual reality environment such that humans can play it against Max (see 
Figure 6). A set of carefully crafted plans allows Max to follow the rules of the game 
based on simple heuristics and all human opponents agreed that it is fun to play 
against him although he is not a particularly strong player. 
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The WASABI architecture was employed to let Max react emotionally 
throughout the game and it led to believable interactivity as will be outlined next. 
4.1 Technical realization and example of an interaction 
---------- 
Insert Figure 7 about here. 
---------- 
  The virtual human MAX is based on a multi-agent system which encapsulates 
his cognitive abilities inside specialized software agents (see Figure 7). These 
software agents communicate with each other by passing messages. 
The Integration/Categorization module is implemented as a so-called Emotion-
Agent, which acts in concert with a number of other agents. In the Skip-Bo scenario 
the Emotion-Agent receives emotional impulses from the BDI-Agent, which is 
continuously being updated with the set of aware emotions. The reasoning processes 
within the BDI-Agent also derive the actual state of Dominance from the context of 
the card game, such that MAX feels dominant whenever it is his turn and non-
dominant, i.e. submissive, otherwise. Thus, whenever the human opponent fails to 
follow the rules of the game, MAX takes the turn to correct her and accordingly feels 
dominant until giving the turn back to the human. Concurrently, the BDI-Agent keeps 
the Visualization-Agent updated about the actual primary emotions and PAD values. 
---------- 
Insert Figure 8 about here. 
---------- 
Figure 8 illustrates an example of an information ﬂow within the WASABI 
architecture. In this sequence diagram the three agents BDI-Agent, Emotion-Agent, 
and Visualization-Agent (‘Vis.-Agent’) are represented as boxes in the top. In the top-
left box, labelled BDI-Agent, three plans—generate-expectation (‘gen. exp.’), check 
expectations (‘check exp.’), and react-to-secondary-emotion (‘react sec.’)—are 
rendered as three white rectangles to show their activity below. The same rectangles 
are used to depict the PAD space as well as the emotions fearful and Fears-Conﬁrmed 
(‘Fears-Conf.’) which all reside in the Emotion-Agent. The internals of the 
Visualization-Agent are not detailed here. In this example it only receives messages 
from the other agents, although in reality it also distributes information about the 
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human player’s interaction with the game by sending messages to the BDI-Agent (see 
Figure 7). 
We will now explain the sequence of message communication between these 
agents for which the time-line runs from top to bottom in Figure 8. At first, the 
generate-expectation plan is called, e.g., after MAX ends his turn by playing one last 
card on one of his stock piles in front of him (see Figure 6). This plan, first, results in 
a negative impulse (‘send impulse neg.’) which is sent by the Reactive appraisal sub-
module to the emotion dynamics of the Emotion-Agent thereby indirectly changing 
MAX’s emotional state in PAD space (see Section 1). Subsequently, while following 
the same plan, the primary emotion fearful is being triggered (‘trigger fearful’) by the 
same Reactive appraisal sub-module of the BDI-Agent, because MAX expects the 
human player to play an important card that would hinder him to fulfil his goal of 
winning the game. 
In the Emotion-Agent, however, the negative emotional impulse pushed the 
reference point in PAD space already close enough to the (not yet triggered) emotion 
fearful to let MAX experience fear with low intensity. This is possible, because we 
decided to set fearful to a slightly positive base intensity of 0.25; see (Becker-Asano 
& Wachsmuth, 2009) for details. In Figure 8 this base intensity is indicated by a 
small double line along the dashed, vertical lifeline of fearful. Accordingly, slightly 
fearful is sent to the Visualization-Agent even before the BDI-Agent triggers the 
emotion fearful. Because the intensity of fearful in the Emotion-Agent abruptly 
changes with the incoming trigger fearful message, MAX’s emotional state changes 
from slightly fearful to very fearful. This sudden change in intensity is reproduced in 
Figure 8 by the two gray triangles drawn along each emotion’s lifelines. Accordingly, 
in that moment Max shows a clear expression of fear in his face (see Figure 6). 
The intensity of fearful decreases within the next ten seconds and the reference 
point changes its location in PAD space due to the implemented emotion dynamics. 
Thus, very fearful automatically changes to fearful (see right side of Figure 8) in the 
absence of any further impulse or trigger messages. 
Next, the Cognitive appraisal module of the BDI-Agent uses the ‘check 
expectations’ plan to check, if a human player’s action matches any of the previously 
generated expectations. In this example, the BDI-Agent, first, sends a negative 
impulse to the Emotion-Agent, because it is assumed here that such a previous 
expectation exists. The reference point’s location in PAD space is thereby changed 
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such that MAX gets very fearful again. This sequence of different emotion intensities 
(slightly fearful, very fearful, fearful, very fearful) can happen in case of every 
primary or secondary emotion, although it is exempliﬁed here only for fearful. It 
results from the dynamic interplay of the Appraisal module and the 
Integration/Categorization module. 
The ‘check expectations’ plan, then, triggers the secondary emotion Fears-
Conﬁrmed (‘trigger Fears-Conf.’) in the Emotion-Agent, thereby maximizing its base 
intensity. Together with the negatively valenced mood, fears-conﬁrmed reaches the 
agent’s level of awareness and is sent back to the BDI-Agent (‘send Fears-Conf.’). In 
effect, the plan react-to-secondary-emotion is executed within the Cognitive 
reappraisal sub-module to process the incoming message. This results in an ‘utter 
Fears-Conf.’ message, which is sent to the Visualization-Agent letting MAX produce 
an appropriate utterance. 
4.2 Misattribution of an emotion’s cause 
A human opponent would possibly explain Max’s behaviour like this:  
After MAX ended his turn with playing a hand card to one of his stock 
piles, he seemed to realize within one or two seconds that I could now 
directly play one of my four stock pile cards. I could derive this from his 
fearful facial expression and the fact that he seemed to inhale sharply 
producing the characteristic sound of someone being afraid. When I then 
actually played that stock card, MAX admitted that he had been afraid of 
that before. 
In the Appraisal module of Max’s cognitive architecture, however, the event that 
caused the fear is disconnected from the finally elicited emotion itself. Thus, if Max 
were asked why he shows fear, he would have to recapitulate which events of the 
recent past could have caused his fear. In principle, a number of events could have 
influenced Max’s emotion dynamics negatively rather directly through Reactive 
appraisal alone leaving no trace in form of cognitive representations. For example, if 
we additionally simulated an artificial hunger level for Max, his slowly getting hungry 
could result in small negative impulses, which are send repeatedly to the Emotion-
Agent and could slowly worsen Max’s mood. Assuming this process to be realized in 
parallel to the BDI-based reasoning module, Max would be unable to consider his 
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being hungry as one factor causing his experience of fear (or any other negative 
emotion).  
Even without modelling additional influences outside of Max’s cognitive 
awareness misattributions could happen in situations in which a high number of 
events quickly succeed each other. For example, if Max cognitively perceived a new 
person entering the scene directly after realizing that the human opponent is likely to 
play a fear-inducing card (see example above), he might later misattribute this new 
person’s appearance to be causing his fear. In fact, this can happen even if the new 
person’s appearance itself had no emotional impact at all. Accordingly, Max being 
asked about why he shows fear in the above example could then be prone to the 
following misattribution: 
I think I fear that person next to you who just entered the room. 
Before we further discuss the pros and cons of our architecture, we will contrast it 
next with related work in the field of affective computing. 
5 Related work 
El-Nasr, Yen, & Ioerger (2000) present FLAME as a formalization of the 
dynamics of 14 emotions based on fuzzy logic rules. It includes a mood value, which 
is continuously calculated as the average of all emotion intensities to provide a 
solution to the problem of conflicting emotions being activated at the same time. Our 
conception of emotion dynamics in the WASABI architecture is quite similar to their 
realization of mutual influence of emotion and mood. 
Marsella and Gratch (2006) focus with their EMA model of emotions on the 
dynamics of emotional appraisal. They also argue for a mood value as an addend in 
the calculation of otherwise equally activated emotional states following the general 
idea of mood-congruent emotions. Their framework for modelling emotions is 
certainly much better suited to explain the cognitive underpinnings of emotions than 
the WASABI architecture can possibly do. Furthermore, it has successfully been 
evaluated as to model human emotion dynamics quite accurately (see Chapter MGP, 
this volume). The strength of the WASABI architecture, however, seems to be the 
relative simplicity with which convincing emotion dynamics (at least of primary 
emotions) can be achieved. With EMA’s rational reasoning approach it seems also 
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much more difficult to explain misattribution of an emotion’s cause, because of the 
direct linking of a domain object and its emotional effect. 
Central to the architecture proposed by Marinier and Laird (2006) is the idea of 
‘Appraisal Frames’, which are based on the EMA model and eleven of Scherer’s 
sixteen appraisal dimensions (see Chapter S of this volume) and are modelled for 
integration in the Soar cognitive architecture (Laird, Newell, & Rosenbloom, 1987). 
They distinguish an ‘Active Appraisal Frame’, which is the result of a momentary 
appraisal of a given event, from a ‘Perceived Appraisal Frame’, which results from 
the combination of the actual mood and emotion frames. Thereby, they take 
Damasio’s distinction between emotion and feeling into account—similarly to the 
conception underlying the WASABI architecture. It has to be noted, however, that 
Damasio defines a feeling as ‘the perception of a certain state of the body along with 
the perception of a certain mode of thinking and of thoughts with certain themes’ 
(Damasio, 2003, p. 86). This definition seems to be even more difficult to 
operationalise than Scherer’s assumption that ‘feelings integrate the central 
representations of appraisal-driven response in emotion’ (Chapter S, page YY, this 
volume). Although it remains a challenging question, if we can ever reasonably 
ascribe feelings to autonomous agents, we believe that following a component 
approach to modelling affect is most promising and to that respect Damasio and 
Scherer seem to agree. 
Aiming at the development of believable conversational agents Pelachaud & 
Bilvi (2003) are continuously improving their ‘Greta’ agent, which is capable of 
producing bodily as well as facial gestures that are consistent with the situational 
context. This consistency is guaranteed by BDI-based modelling of Greta’s ‘mind’ 
(Rosis, Pelachaud, Poggi, Carofiglio, & Carolis, 2003) resulting in an architecture, 
which allows for the inclusion of an emotion model. The latter builds upon a 
‘Dynamic Belief Network’ to account for the inherent dynamics of emotional 
processes, which is also central to our work as outlined above. Recently, Ochs, 
Devooght, Sadek, & Pelachaud (2006) presented another BDI-based approach to 
implement OCC-based appraisal for Greta. 
The layered model of affect ALMA uses PAD space to derive an agent’s mood 
from emotions that are themselves the result of OCC-based appraisal (Gebhard, 
2005). ALMA is rooted in a purely cognitive approach to modelling affect, which was 
only later extended by a representation of all 22 OCC emotions (plus ‘liking’ and 
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‘disliking’) in PAD space. Accordingly, in evaluating ALMA, Gebhard & Kipp 
(2006) heavily rely on third person rational judgement of the believability of emotion 
and mood labels, which ALMA generates for two interacting conversational agents. 
For WASABI, in contrast, the emotional effect of Max’s affective behaviour in direct 
playful face-to-face interaction has been evaluated to be beneficial (Becker, 
Prendinger, Ishizuka, & Wachsmuth, 2005). In Chapter SCHR of this volume 
(Schröder, 2004) introduces his approach to emotional speech synthesis, which is 
based on PAD space as well. 
6 Conclusions and discussion 
In contrast to most existing computational affect simulation models the 
WASABI architecture focuses on capturing the temporal dynamics of emotions and 
mood and makes only very few commitments regarding how cognitive appraisal is to 
be realized. Furthermore, the WASABI architecture breaks the link between an 
emotion eliciting domain object and the resulting emotion itself and how this can be 
exploited to realize misattribution of an emotion’s cause. 
We admit, however, that the conceptual decisions taken in designing the 
WASABI architecture are not without questionable consequences. A major challenge 
is the question of how WASABI can account for the occurrence of mixed emotions. 
For example, imagine yourself cueing up for taking a ride in a roller coaster, which is 
likely to produce an adrenalin rush. In such a moment happiness of expecting a 
pleasurable ride appears to be mixed with fearing possible negative consequences of 
the same event in case of an accident. Although both emotions, happy and fearful, 
might be triggered by the Reactive appraisal sub-module (see Figure 1), the distance 
between these two emotions in PAD space makes it impossible for Max to be aware 
of them simultaneously. In fact, the assured mood-congruency of emotions prevents 
in this case the simultaneous elicitation of positively valenced happiness and 
negatively valenced fear. It can be argued, however, that in humans these two 
emotions are also not experienced simultaneously, but in quick succession one after 
the other depending on a human’s focus of cognitive attention. 
Another challenge to be addressed in future research is how we can model and 
test the emotion-related effects an agent’s personality. So far, we heuristically 
determined reasonable values for the parameters of the emotion dynamics simulation. 
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We believe, however, that by changing these parameters we can systematically 
change an observer’s judgement of the agent’s personality. Although the ‘Big Five’ 
personality schema with its proposed relation to PAD space (Mehrabian A., 1996) is 
commonly used to realize an agent’s personality (Gebhard, 2005), we believe that our 
conception of an emotion dynamics is already powerful enough to allow for the 
creation of different personalities within WASABI-driven agents. 
Finally, how to realize cognitive reappraisal is still an open topic for the 
WASABI architecture. The BDI-based architectures discussed in Section 5 are much 
better suited to explain the why of an emotion, because their emotion elicitation is 
explicitly based on rational reasoning processes. Thus, we believe that combining 
WASABI’s core ideas (see Section 1) with these more cognitively motivated affect 
simulation architectures would yield interesting results and in doing so we might also 
achieve a more complete picture of a human’s emotional life. 
In summary, we hope that the WASABI architecture contributes to the diverse 
theories and ideas within the emotion research community and also provides a 
valuable technical contribution to the question of how to endow embodied agents with 
affective competency.  
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Figure 1. A general overview of the WASABI architecture with its ‘Appraisal 
module’ on top and the internal ‘Integration/Categorization module’ at the bottom 
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Figure 2. Details of the emotion dynamics part inside the 
integration/categorization module of the WASABI architecture 
 
 
Figure 3. The (P)leasure-(A)rousal-(D)ominance space with nine primary 
emotions (indicated by the labelled red crosses) and three secondary emotions – 
‘hope’ (green), ‘relief’ (blue), and ‘fears-confirmed’ (red) – assigned to the high and 
low dominance planes. 
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Figure 4. The virtual human ‘Max’, left, and an outline of its architectural 
framework, right; reproduced from (Leßmann, Kopp, & Wachsmuth, 2006) 
 
 
Figure 5. The ‘Appraisal module’ of the WASABI architecture with its 
subcomponents ‘Reactive appraisal’, ‘Cognitive appraisal’, and ‘Cognitive 
reappraisal’ 
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Figure 6. Screen shot of Max playing Skip-Bo against a human opponent in the 
virtual reality installation of the Faculty of Technology at Bielefeld University, 
Germany. The red areas in front of the human’s hand cards are her stock piles, which 
are visible to Max and enable him to generate expectations about which cards she 
might play next. Accordingly, in the moment depicted here Max expresses his fear of 
her playing the ‘8’ on top of the ‘7’ on one of the three shared target piles to the right 
of the virtual table. 
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Figure 7. The three most important software agents in the Skip-Bo scenario are 
presented together with their interconnection realized by means of message passing. 
The Appraisal module is part of the BDI-Agent, the Integration/categorization 
module resides inside the Emotion-Agent, and the Visualization-Agent renders the 3D 
graphics including the game and the Max agent. A user’s interaction with the game is 
also handled by the Visualization-Agent and then forwarded to the BDI-Agent. 
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Figure 8. Sequence diagram of an information ﬂow between the software agents 
with the time-line from top to bottom 
